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MARCH.

1898.

ANNALS
OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

SOCIOLOGY APPLIED TO POLITICS.

SOCIAL THEORIES AND RUSSIAN CONDITIONS.

In the latter years of our century sociologists have not only elucidated various historical phenomena, but have also endeavored to apply the sociological propositions to politics. Such an attempt has been made by Dr. Gumpłowicz, Professor at the University of Graz in Austria.* Without entering into a discussion of his sociological convictions, more fully treated in another of his works on sociology, I wish to criticise the part applied to the political questions. It seems to be all the more called for, because his pamphlet contains ideas that are now widely spread among European readers and which will gain further currency through a proposed French translation.

In the practical part of his pamphlet, Professor Gumpłowicz endeavors to prove that politics must become a science, based on natural laws, and not consist only of the formulation of desiderata for the actions of rulers, and of the estimation of their doings determined by the criteria of self-interest. Political practice that does not recognize these laws, leads to an aimless dissipation of social forces.

* "*Sociologie und Politik*," von Ludwig Gumpłowicz. Leipzig, 1892.

For instance, in Austria from the year 1848 it was attempted by means of an ideal political doctrine to transform Austria, composed of "lands and kingdoms," having an altogether different historical past, into one German state. This transformation could not be effected, notwithstanding the greatest and most costly efforts; these attempts were immoral and unwise, because living nationalities cannot be oppressed and crushed in a civilized state.* Evidently the author rejects human interference with natural laws and finds a slow exploitation of feeble groups, and their prolonged starvation from exhaustion more suitable to civilization. We find also this care for living nationalities completely opposed to all his statements in sociology, to the impulse of self-preservation leading to conquests for exploitation, to the identity of social laws in a primitive horde and in civilized states, to the wastefulness of nature with living organisms, etc., etc.

After these preliminary remarks, the author proceeds to treat the most important contemporary European questions. We can restrict our remarks to two, viz., the relation of Western Europe to Russia, and the relation of the Germans to the Slavonic peoples.

Professor Gumplowicz is convinced that the fundamental principle of European politics must be the recognition that Europe is divided into two worlds, profoundly different one from the other. Though Western Europe consists of several states, it presents a certain civilized whole that is opposed to Russia. Each of these worlds is seeking to enlarge its limits, and shock is inevitable. Because Russia, in consequence of its economic riches and the vastness of its territory, appears as an enormous force which tends naturally to grow, Western Europe must profit by all possible means of resistance to Russia's efforts to expand. Russia, as a continental state, is trying to reach the sea, and seize Constantinople; therefore, Europe, and especially the most

* Pp. 103-13.

endangered nations, Germany and Austria, ought to strive to weaken the influence of Russia in Bulgaria. It is evident, says Professor Gumpłowicz, how deeply Bismarck was mistaken in saying "that the interests of Germany are not at all involved in Bulgaria!" Quite the contrary, says Professor Gumpłowicz; a slice of Bulgaria will strengthen Russia and modify the chances of the whole of Western Europe in the struggle. The author is so profoundly convinced of the truth and persuasiveness of his arguments that he even expects a union of the interests of France and Germany against Russia, and presumes the possibilities of a defensive and aggressive alliance! The aim of such an alliance of Western Europe ought to be the separation from Russia of Bulgaria, Roumania, Poland, Finland. The purpose of the civilization of Western Europe must be to fence itself off from Asiatic barbarism and despotism, and to secure individual liberty, self-determination and equality*

As the author does not define exactly the distinguishing features between the two worlds, we shall endeavor to do so for him. A despotism formerly signified a state, in which the will of the despot was exclusively considered as the law, and the direction, prescribed by him, determined the whole scope of social life.† Now it is acknowledged that such states do not exist except for very short periods, and that a despotism of this kind must be regarded as a disease of a state and not as its permanent form. The Pharaohs of Egypt and the great Kings of Persia were probably much more limited by customs and manners, and especially by religion, than are the ministers of her Majesty, the Queen of England, by law. It is very well known that in Russia the laws have been published from the very beginning of the state. Probably in the thirteenth century the private juridical work, called "*Russkaya Pravda*" (Russian Law), and containing principally the decisions of the courts, took

*Pp. 113-29.

†"*Encyclopædie der Staatswissenschaften.*" von Robert von Mohl. Second edition. Tübingen. §§ 15, 40-50.

its final shape. In the years 1497 and 1550 more extensive laws, designed to guide the activity of the judges (*Sudebnik*) were edited by the government. In 1648 appeared "*Ulozhenie*," or a legal code, settling the organization of the whole empire. From the time of Peter the Great, a long series of committees began the codification of the Russian laws. This work was completed in 1832, when, after more than a hundred years of labor, a complete collection of the laws of the Russian Empire, in fourteen volumes, was published. This great code embraces a vast field of legal, political and social relations, and the innumerable multitude of separate laws on different objects cannot be mentioned here for want of space; but the code shows that the order of social life is based on legal rules and not on the will of the emperor, and that the sphere of law was long ago separated from the sphere of customs, manners and religion. I add this remark because the characteristic feature of the old monarchies of the East was a mixture of morality, religion and law, so that the activity of individuals was determined not by legal but by moral and religious principles.

If the foregoing definition of a despotism does not apply to Russia, if the legal element was evident in her history from the very first, the application of the term "despotism" to her is only explicable in consequence of the lack of popular participation in her government. We shall examine how far this peculiarity can be acknowledged as a characteristic, as if it were innate in the Russian people. I employ the word "innate," because it is not worth while speaking about a peculiarity, when it is a transient and not essential quality.

First, we may observe in Western Europe enormous fluctuations in the popular participation in government. During long periods it was not known at all. Besides that, its character was extremely changeable: army, aristocracy, different classes, political parties, had in turn an influence in government. Now, political parties often form an artificial

majority of popular representatives and in this manner legally exploit the people. It can be said without great exaggeration that continental Europe has not yet assimilated this form of government, transplanted not very long ago from England. The instability of ministers, the abuses during elections, the collapse of parties, the corruptibility of members, and the scandalous scenes in parliaments, are obvious proof. Professor Gumplowicz's native land (Austria) seems, in both of its parts, to be very far from a true parliamentary "régime." In Austria proper the majority of deputies, artificially produced, is only a means for the exploitation of the Slavonic majority by a German minority; in Hungary the parliament consists almost exclusively of Magyars who form hardly one-half of the whole population—a result which is reached by brute force. It is evident that it is a little hazardous to speak of liberty, self-determination, and equality of the individuals, as a characteristic of Western Europe.

Passing on to Russia, we find during the early period of Russian political life the greatest participation of the people in the government. From the ninth to the second half of the fifteenth century, the Russian dukes and grand-dukes were little more than the executive organs of *véche*, the great assembly in which the people were wont to gather. These popular assemblies were remnants of the primitive Aryan social organization. The great difference between Russian parliaments and those of Western Europe was, that the latter were much more aristocratic in consequence of the early differentiation of Western society. Such a republican form of government prevailed in Northern Russia, Novgorod and Pskov, until the absorption of these city-republics by the grand-dukes of Moscow. The power of these grand-dukes grew little by little, principally under the influence of Byzantine ideas, yet the participation of the people in the government did not disappear, but took another shape. Ivan the Fourth, the Terrible, of odious

memory, convoked about the year 1548 the first assembly of deputies in order to free himself from the predominance of the *boyars*, the Russian nobility, formed from the most heterogeneous elements. This nobility did not resemble the Western aristocracy, as it was not pervaded by a class-spirit; it was not a political body endowed by definite laws, but a class consisting of different families, having each some peculiar "honor" (or distinction), deserved by the grandfathers and fathers of the family. Each family was, as in old Rome (*jus imaginum*), a separate whole with a peculiar political and social position, according to the services of its members to the state. No political bond united the aristocratic families together. Such an origin of parliaments in Russia caused the whole population, and not merely the clergy, nobility and citizens, as in the West, to take part in the government. The assemblies had much influence on administration and legislation. The code of 1648 was examined by deputies. During the years 1613-1615 the assembly practically governed the state, the czar being young and inexperienced, and the times disturbed. This parliamentary régime lasted in Russia till the second half of the seventeenth century. The question now arises as to what caused the disappearance of the national representation, whether it was inborn antipathy or external influences.

The decision of political questions by the whole people is a wide-spread phenomenon. The appearance of national deputies instead of the whole people is a necessary consequence of the growth of larger political units and of the diminution of interest in political affairs. So far, the facts above described are quite intelligible. We must delve deeper to understand the changes in the last half of the seventeenth century.

The deification of the state came to Russia from Byzantium with the Greek church; and in this the Byzantine spirit fully preserved the ideals of ancient Greece. The idea that the grand-dukes are the representatives of

the state, and, therefore, absolute, was developed in Russia under the influence of the clergy very slowly; the invasions of the Mongols and continued wars with the Lithuanians and Poles, rendered the necessity of a strong government more imperious. But, notwithstanding all this, the czar was considered only as a living, visible representative of the state, which stood immensely above the czar and his people; both of whom were mere ciphers without the state. This pagan, classical idea received a new force from the intimate union of the church with the state; war was waged only with Mussulmans and Latins (Roman Catholics) and was in the eyes of clergy and people a sacred war. Thus the state enslaved all society. The czar is the ruler of the state, appointed by the finger of God and consecrated by anointment with the sacred oil, but his will should not predominate, should not be even evident, because he is only the organ of a higher force, of the interests of the state; when the latter demand it, he could be crushed as well as the humblest of his servants. This inference from the Byzantine political conceptions is not so prominent in Russia, but appears very clearly in Byzantium. This idea of sovereign power prevented the institution of an exact order of succession to the Byzantine throne. In Russia this deification of the state had an enormous influence on the origin of the classes. In Moscow classes appeared as a consequence of the diversity of obligations to the state. Every member of society was expected to serve the state, but while some defended it on the fields of battle, others brought to it their manual labor and furnished revenues to the state treasury. At the beginning (in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) these classes were almost equal; in the archives we sometimes find requests of the lower nobility (*deti boyarski, dvorjane*) for permission to remain as peasants in their village, because it is too oppressive for a poor *dvorjanin* to serve in the army. But this petition is never granted; the state subordinates the different

social groups to a severe control. These diverse social groups are called in Moscow "*cini*;" they must agree with each other and all of them with the czar on the question of how the interests of the state may be most conveniently promoted. Thus we see that the parliaments in Moscow were a necessary consequence of the political ideal, which inspired all Russian society, from the czar to his humblest subject. The will of the czar gave juridical force to the acts of government, but these acts were the results of a most profound knowledge of the real conditions of the state, which could be obtained exclusively from the *cini*. To all this must be added that this strange, singularly developed society, was extremely illiterate. The struggle with wild nature in a cold climate, continual warfare with barbarous nations made this society energetic and intelligent, but the light of science and industry was almost unknown. The mind was developed only in the practice of life. Therefore good counsel could be expected from the lowest citizen, since he also belonged to a certain group which bore certain burdens of the state, occupying itself specially with a certain kind of labor. This social condition began little by little to change in the seventeenth century. In consequence of the closer intercourse with the Poles, who were passionate admirers of the Western civilization, the court and the higher nobility gradually became convinced that the Muscovite régime must be modified in a direction bringing it nearer to the Western pattern. This conviction penetrated the more readily into the Russian higher circles, as one of the most fundamental tenets of Western civilization was the preponderance of the leading classes over the lower orders. In such an ideal the parliaments, consisting of the deputies of the whole people, were out of place for some time; their conservatism would lead them to make the most stubborn opposition to these innovations, which in the eyes of the people were not only hurtful but even godless (they came from the Latins, the avowed foes of the Orthodox church).

Thus the abolition of Russian representation was an inevitable result of the Western influence.

This explanation finds further confirmation in the fact that Western science and industry by degrees gained a foothold in Russian society. As the industries were mostly represented by strangers of different nations, sciences and political ideas spread in the richer circles which had more frequent intercourse with the Western Europeans. Thus a chasm was produced between the higher classes and the people which was before quite unknown in Moscow. As the nobility was more and more educated, *i. e.*, penetrated by the Western social and political ideas, it saw in itself the only depository of culture, the only class which might with utility be consulted by the state. As the higher strata, however, served the state personally, and the lower ones by manual labor and payments to the treasury, the idea could very easily arise that the nobility even without special assemblies, might give its counsel in manifold occasions during its personal service. Finally, the Western influence coincided with the time, when the "police-state" (*Polizei-staat*) prevailed in Europe. According to the ideal of such a state, the governors, as a highly educated class, should watch every step of the people in the people's interest, just as a governess watches a child. Popular assemblies were not in fashion during the eighteenth century and, strange as it may seem, even the Convention of the great French Revolution was permeated by the idea that the people did not know their own interests. The Russian government and the ruling classes had much of these tendencies of European thought. All these changes in thought tended to weaken and even destroy the old remnant of the popular representation.

The change in ideas of government under Western influences corresponded to the changes in society. As we have seen, in Moscow the will of the czar could not be questioned, because he himself was only an

organ of the state. Therefore the wishes of the population and principally of the clergy, had a great influence with the czar. He was accessible to all his subjects and the petitions to the throne from towns, cities, provinces, corporations, and even individuals had an enormous importance. It was a species of written representation of popular wants and necessities, not yet fully appreciated even by the best Russian historians. The accessibility of the throne was rooted in the idea, that the czar himself was destined by God for the well being of society, and that he was only the first servant of the state (the profound conviction so often expressed by Peter the Great). There was no place in these conceptions for a gap between the sovereign power and the people. But this idea was quite opposed to the Western ideas, the evolution of which was the following: The king was anciently a person designated by God to rule the common people with the help of the clergy and the nobility, according to eternal laws, given by the Creator; afterward, when feudal society fell to pieces, he was the representative of the cultivated classes of society, fit to rule the people according to the requirements of reason (*absolutisme éclairé*). In both cases a minority, having at its head a king, ruled a great majority and, in the common course of human affairs, exploited the latter. Evidently no great confidence could arise between the governors and the governed, and, therefore, we see in the eighteenth century a profound distrust between the sovereign powers and their subjects arising in the European nations. This latent feeling evidenced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by a large increase of actual and secret police, broke out at the end of the century in the great French Revolution. This want of confidence between throne and people, together with the means of governing (actual and secret police), invented by the Western spirit, predestined to "liberty, self-determination and equality of individuals," was transplanted to Russia for the coercion of Asiatic barbarism of

the Russian people, as was said in the eighteenth century by the Western civilizers, who came to Russia.

It might be argued, however, that our remarks relate to the past and not to the present, and that we acknowledge the change in Russian social relations, and that now, possibly even under Western influence, the state has assumed the form of a despotism, and society itself is altogether opposed to "self-determination." To resolve this question, we must turn to contemporary Russian society and begin with the '40's of our century. Although the sojourn of the Russian army in France after the Napoleonic wars made many officers the passionate admirers of French political ideas and this evoked a military insurrection, it did not engender social opinions, more or less independent of the West. An original social party first arose under the influence of German idealistic philosophy (Hegel). The "Slavophiles" saw the national Russian ideal in the Muscovite state and considered the Western influences as an intrusion of foreign thoughts, hurtful to the development of the Russian national spirit. They took for granted that Western Europe had arrived at the highest point of its civilization, and that it must necessarily fall, because the ideas, which gave it vigor, are withering. The Roman ideas and the Catholic church, permeated by them, had in their view materialized Western society and the result was on the one hand an unparalleled material progress and comfort, but on the other a fall in the direction toward the ideal good and even a failure to understand this good. This ideal good, at which the old Greek philosophy continually aimed, was preserved in the Orthodox church. It consisted in mutual love of the whole of humanity. Western society, on the contrary, pursuing its material interests, must necessarily live in a state of continual war. This spirit, inherited from ancient Rome, appeared very clearly in the ecclesiastical organization. While the Catholic church took the form of a monarchy, so convenient in the struggle for power over the world, and therefore declared

the pope a representative of Jesus Christ on earth, the Orthodox church took for its foundation the Saviour's words: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." (Matthew, xviii. 20.) Hence arose the preponderance of the council over persons in the Orthodox church, the most evident difference between the two churches, and this in turn led to the tenet that the Orthodox church has no visible chief, but only an invisible one, Jesus Christ. According to the profound conviction of the Slavophiles, the East, notwithstanding its want of culture and its poverty, conceals in its bosom a virtue unknown or at least forgotten by the West, namely, the craving for an ideal. In politics the Slavophiles admitted the importance of a national council of the whole people, which should stand side by side with the czar and, not limiting his power, should make him acquainted with the popular wishes, criticise the measures already passed, and judge of the measures proposed. In economics, they preached an almost prohibitory tariff, the most energetic intervention of the state and most vigorous protection of the laboring classes against exploitation. Finally, in foreign politics they required the most active assistance to all Slav nations and abstinence from all Western political struggles. They believed that the unlimited craving for material progress must necessarily bring Western society to revolution and anarchy, to the uprising of all the degraded, feeble, indigent, indolent, and that only then would the time come for Russia to establish order on the eternal principles of justice and mutual love.

The formation of this powerful and flourishing party, having great influence in politics, foreign and home affairs, has brought about a closer union of the admirers of the West and engendered "the Western party" (*zapadniki*.) Their endeavor was to transplant into Russia all the newest Western opinions, as if they were the newest scientific truths; they called for parliaments in the same form as in

England or France; they insisted on the system *laissez faire, laissez passer*, so fashionable at that time in Europe; they were passionate partisans of tariffs on the basis of free trade. The Western nations naturally sympathized with them, and notwithstanding their great love "of liberty, self-determination and equality of individuals," they did not find it too prejudicial to their honor to denounce the Slavophiles on the one hand to the Russian government, as radicals, socialists, nihilists, and on the other to the public opinion of Europe as passionate conservatives, avowed foes of all progress, barbarians who wished to establish despotism in Europe and to convert all European nations by force to the Orthodox church.

In the course of time these two parties lost their sharply defined peculiarities, but at the bottom remained the same. It is not difficult to see that they are based on different philosophical systems. We find in the Slavophiles much of the idea of the German historical school about the national spirit vivifying the whole evolution of every nation, and some ideas from Hegel, who dwelt upon the predestination of nations in history according to the logical development of thought. In the eyes of Slavophiles, the Slavonic world ought to reconcile two antitheses: the liberty of individuals, inborn in Teutonic peoples; and order, represented by Roman law, Roman political ideas, the Catholic church. The Western party, on the contrary, founded their statements on the assumption that every people passes in its growth through the same stages of evolution, that it is very proper to transplant institutions from an older nation, into a country, taking its first steps in civilization; and that progress can in this manner be artificially accelerated. Considering both parties we find that in both of them national representation finds a prominent place, and hence it cannot be said of Russian society that it has an inborn tendency to despotism.

Passing on to the government and beginning with our

century we note that Alexander I. was animated by very progressive ideas, having been educated by a Swiss who instilled in him an admiration for the Swiss republic. He gave a parliament to Poland, annexed to Russia by the treaty of Vienna, and was not averse to having the same in Russia; but Napoleon's wars, "the Holy Alliance," with its extremely conservative tendencies, and Metternich, the omnipotent Austrian minister, kept him from executing his plan. The military insurrection of the year 1825 had an enormous influence on his successor, Nicholas I., and with the general course of European thought at that time, turned him to the support of the conservative powers in Europe. Although Nicholas' reign was an iron discipline for Russia, the czar, feeling that legality only could preserve him from the reproach of an arbitrary use of the sovereign power, laid great stress on the observation of legal rules in the whole administration. It must be, however, acknowledged that at the time, even in the opinion of the Slavophiles, a parliament in Russia would have been dangerous for the following reasons: The social class, which had served the state on the fields of battle had become under Western influence a nobility in the Western sense of the word, *i. e.*, a leading and ruling stratum of society. Simultaneously the relations of the laborers to the nobility became transformed. When, at the end of the sixteenth century, bondage was instituted in Russia, it was not at all a degradation for the laborers and a prerogative to the *dvorjane*, but only a form of payment to the state for military service. The peasants, serving the state by manual labor, from the end of the sixteenth century, devoted their manual labor to the military class in order that it might more correctly and conveniently fill the army. As I have said, military service and its equivalent, gratuitous labor, were of so little value that often a poor *dvorjanin* preferred to be a peasant. But these conditions changed altogether under Peter III. and Catherine II. The latter agreeing entirely with the views of

Montesquieu, that the nobility is the fundamental support of the throne and monarchy, confirmed the law of Peter III. in 1785, which liberated the *dvorjane* from obligatory military service, and thus turned them into a nobility and their peasants into serfs, obliged by their labor to sustain the leading class in order that it might develop itself intellectually. Hence if there had been a parliament in Russia in the reign of Nicholas I., it would have been composed almost exclusively of nobles, and, therefore, the abolition of bondage would have been rendered, if not impossible, yet very difficult and very long deferred.

The great reforms of Alexander II. are yet in the memory of all. He was disposed to complete the emancipation of the serfs, the reforms in the administration of justice, the organization of self-government in provinces and cities with a re-establishment of the Russian national representation, when the thread of his precious life was violently broken. Alexander III., when yet heir to the throne, shared the ideas of the Slavophiles, and after his accession, during his whole reign, was a brilliant representative of their doctrines. The strengthening of the religious, moral and economic forces of his people, the protection of the laboring classes, in a word, the internal growth of Russia in all directions entirely absorbed him. He profoundly disliked all military undertakings and considered the conservation of peace as his most sacred obligation; a strong conviction of the holiness of the mission as an emperor gave him a great aversion to the frauds, so frequent in international intercourse, and filled his heart with benevolence toward all nations. The mistrust of Alexander III., as well as of not a few persons of the Russian ruling classes toward the parliamentary form of government can be well explained by two facts. First, we find among the most progressive and original European and American writers *

*Karl Marx with all the socialistic and anarchistic school, de Greef, Ward.

much skepticism in regard to popular representation *in its contemporary form*. While fifteen years ago it was considered as a panacea for all social diseases, it is often spoken of now as of a shrewd form of exploitation of the laboring classes by the wealthy and intelligent. Secondly, parliaments have shown weaknesses in different countries, in France—a diminution of the feeling of the necessity of a strong government; in Germany—an extraordinary splitting of political parties; in Austria-Hungary—an extreme facility of composing a parliament of elements, odious even to the majority of the population; in North America—a distrust of state legislatures and many plans for limiting their sphere of action.*

The manifest corruptibility of the deputies (Panama, Banca Romana) adds a greater stain to nations than the corruptibility of individual rogues in the administration. The phenomena, above cited, led to the presumption that a national assembly is not the last word as to the form of the participation of society in government, and, it seems to me that under the emperors Alexander II. and III., a new form of representation began imperceptibly to evolve itself, namely, the discussion of laws by persons, invited by government from society, because from them the best counsel could be expected on account of their knowledge of the object of laws. And if we now turn to scientific literature, we find since the time of the German professors Ahrens and Roder, that the substitution of the usual national representation by the representation of social groups, engaged in the varied forms of business, in art, sciences, etc., in order to represent the interests of certain occupations, is desired more and more. It will replace a somewhat metaphysical idea of representation of the will of the nation by the idea of representation of the different

*Bryce. "The American Commonwealth." London and New York, 1890. Vol. i. pp. 427, 428, 450-52, 458-72.

professions of the nation.* Thus we can hope that in Russia in the course of time will appear the most practical representation which is desired by the most advanced minds of Europe and America (Ahrens, de Greef, Ward).

The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is, that it is a great mistake, though frequent in Europe and America, to believe Russian society prone to despotism. On the contrary, Russia is well acquainted with Western national representation, but also sees clearly its weak points. The government understands the advantage of hearing the voice of the people, but holds that the forms of representation, known up to this time do not satisfy all requirements. Finally, a strong government, the need of which is so widely felt in the Russian nation, seems to offer important advantages not only in international struggles, where it is generally acknowledged, but at home where a vigorous arm is no less needed to bring relief to the poor, the weak, and even to the whole society.

Notwithstanding all that has been said in the foregoing, there is some truth in the distinction between Russia and Western Europe. The necessity of a strong government is, without doubt, more keenly felt in Russia; the pre-eminence of aristocracy in all the functions of political and social life is more remarkable in the West, notwithstanding all its professed love for equality; finally the antithesis of the classes is stronger in Western Europe than in Russia, although apparently (in dress and in external respects, generally) in the latter country the differences seem to be enormous. These differences can readily be explained historically.

The antithesis of ecclesiastical and mundane society arose at the time of the formation of divers German states on the ruins of the Western Roman empire. It was rooted, first, in blood, the clergy being almost exclusively Roman

*This was recently widely discussed in Belgium during the revision of the constitution. Such a representation was favored by many, who termed it a representation of interests.

(Romanized Germans were few); secondly, in education; and, lastly, in the quality of the central points of attraction (a bishop or archbishop on the one hand, a king on the other). The recognition of the grandeur of the truth preached by the church aggravated the feeling of injuries often suffered from the civil powers, and led to the antagonism between the church and the state, the sparks of which glowed beneath the embers from the fifth century and burst out in the time of Gregory VII. and Henry IV., producing an indelible mistrust and even enmity between the church and the state, not yet effaced. Evidently these feelings of the clergy were reflected also in civil society, and could not but impair consideration for the sovereign power. It is, I believe, a truth, not yet fully recognized by Western scholars that the Roman Catholic church is the true cause of this spirit of mistrust against the sovereign power, which seems to be an inborn quality of every Western European. He seems to believe that the government is almost a power of darkness which should be limited as much as possible. He considers it as something quite external to society, and hence the latter always must be on the alert not to be subjugated by the former. Therefore, the last resort of every government, the most despotic or the most republican, is the conviction of the whole nation as to the strength, necessity, and form of the government. Every government must understand that it is but a part of society; that its interests and the interests of society are the same; that its military, economic, intellectual, moral power is that of the nation. This very simple idea is completely obscured in the West and even in America, where the state has no power of itself. Hence the power of the state is only the power of a part of society (leading classes in Western Europe, political parties in England and America), which evidently takes advantage of the other social parties: it only utilizes the occasion which will speedily pass, and not so soon occur again.* On the

* This is, to my mind, the true cause of the spoils system in North America.

contrary, in Byzantium, two causes prevented the rise of such an antagonism between the state and the church. Heresies appeared in the Byzantine empire in consequence of the proneness of the Greek spirit to philosophical discussion. The policy of the state toward them was very wise. The emperor convoked assemblies of the clergy who should freely discuss the questions at liberty; the majority of voices was considered as the opinion inspired by the Holy Ghost, accepted by the emperor and made obligatory even by force. Thus the state was sure to have on its side the majority of the clergy, which in turn were very grateful that dissensions were crushed and that order was kept in the church. In this manner, freedom and tranquillity were preserved. On the other hand, the state, taking in its hand the guarantee for the opinions of the majority, freed the church from the degrading scenes of *auto-da-fé* and the holy inquisition. The state suppression of heresies was never so sanguinary as in the West of Europe, because the state, always having in view its political interests, considered even heretics as a part of society, giving force to the state, and principally because it always dreaded an alliance of the heretics with the external foes of the empire. Toleration was more general in the East and very useful to the development of a true Christian spirit. Secondly, all the wars of Byzantium were waged against the avowed enemies of the Orthodox church (Persians, Arabs, Latins, Turks); and were therefore viewed by the clergy and the people as sacred wars; this idea was evident in the prayers and processions of the army going to war. These two causes (the solution of religious dissensions with the aid of the state and the wars against the infidels) brought the church to the conviction of the identity of the interests of the state and that of the church, practically to the policy of supporting the state with all possible means and, theoretically, to the deification of the state, *i. e.*, to the view that the state is the organization of society directly instituted by

God, and, therefore, holy.* To these fundamental causes of the absence of antagonism between the church and the state, must be added not a few minor ones; for example, that the Byzantine throne was occupied by a long series of distinguished writers, philosophers, reformers, who could well understand the interests of the church and who sought to elevate and purify the religious spirit of society; further, that no chasm existed between the ecclesiastical and the civil class, since even patriarchs were sometimes laymen, for instance, the eminent Photius; therefore, the interests of the church were not alien to the civil circles as in the West; lastly, that the Byzantine society was composed of very heterogeneous elements, to whom only the Orthodox church as a state-religion gave unity, etc. All these ideas of the relation of the state to the church, of the Orthodox church as a state-religion, etc., were transplanted into Russia, and became there under the influence of the clergy an indestructible part of the national ideas.

The pre-eminence of the aristocracy in all the functions of political and social life and the antithesis of the diverse classes, were deeply rooted in the Western society. Christianity, as a religion imported from afar, spread itself principally in the cities, where there was a greater gathering of different nations for trade and industry; we find in the cities also schools, which diffused every sort of knowledge. So a chasm arose between the dwellers in cities and the villagers, as between a class, better educated and penetrated by Christian doctrines, and peasants, who, during the whole middle ages, presented much uncouthness and many heathen prejudices. This antithesis is testified even yet by the word

*The state, on the contrary, in the idea of Gregory VII., appeared as a necessary consequence of the depraved nature of man and only a means for his discipline. Therefore, the state is a temporary institution which must perish, when sin, by the action of the church and the punishing arm of the state, will disappear. Eicken. "*Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung.*" Stuttgart, 1887. Pp. 356-436. The conception of the state, as of an agent which is called in when necessity demands, seems to prevail in the Catholic church until now.

paganus, païen "pagan," that signified, first, villager, and afterward, a heathen. Hence the idea necessarily arises, that the higher classes, as more educated, must rule over the lower orders. This conception was very clearly enunciated in the time of Charlemagne in a letter, written to him by Alcuin.* The same opinions found expression in the year 825, when Louis the Pious formally recognized the right of the aristocracy to take part in the government.† I think it is too well known to be much dwelt upon, that the feudal system added much to the gulf between the governors and the governed. The Catholic church in its antagonism to the state gave a sacred character to the participation of the aristocracy in government, saying that God Himself calls the ecclesiastical powers and the aristocracy to the help of the king, and that even they are answerable before God for the use of such share in government. The Catholic church considered itself as a guardian of the rightful order in the world, and as the church itself was too feeble for such an undertaking, it used all its influence to turn the aristocracy into its blind instrument. So the tenet was formed, clearly expressed by Bracton, as follows:

"Now the king hath one set over him, that is, God. Likewise the law, whereby he is made king. Likewise his own court, to wit, his barons and earls; for earls are called comites, as being the king's companions, and who hath a companion hath a master. So if the king be without bridle, that is, without law, they must put the bridle upon him."‡

Besides all this, the Latin language, facilitating the literary intercourse among the Western nations and the knowledge of which, as a dead language, could only be acquired in schools, necessarily separated the lower orders from the more intelligent circles, and left the former to

* Alcuin. "*Epistolae*." 127. "*Populus juxta sanctiones divinas ducendus est, non sequendus, et ad testimonium personae magis eliguntur honestae. Nec audiendi quinsolent dicere: Vox populi vox Dei, cum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxime sit.*"

† Capit. from 825, art. 3. Pertez. *Leges*. Vol. i, p. 243.

‡ Pollock. "*Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics.*" p. 212. London, 1882.

themselves. The crusades filled the warriors with the great Christian ideas of equality, brotherhood, and other thoughts, partially inferred from Christianity (a deep religious spirit, a great esteem for women, and the wish to support the indigent and the feeble), and partially imported from the East (the love for the fantastic). From these influences was born the literature of chivalry, which produced a new social class with specific customs, manners, opinions, identical throughout the West. Thus, during the middle ages, arose various classes differing greatly in all the functions of social life; the clergy, after the introduction of celibacy, a social body completely locked up in itself, with its own laws, a chief, self-government, political ideals, etc.; the aristocracy, persuaded that God Himself laid upon it together with the emperor and kings the government of the nations; the chivalry, forming a great body, pervaded by a characteristic spirit, having the same manners, customs, standard of life, everywhere in the West; finally the citizens, occupying themselves with industry and trade, also with their law and political organization, strictly applied to the wants of their livelihood; the peasants hardly constituted a social class, but were considered laboring cattle. This social order, evolved during the middle ages, was so deeply rooted in the convictions of Western society, that it was thought as pre-established for the whole humanity by the wisdom of God. Nor can we speak in later history of a unification of the Western classes; on the contrary, we find a preponderance of one class over all the others. So the citizens with their political ideals reign almost exclusively in France since the first revolution, and prevail more and more throughout Western Europe. Mr. Herbert Spencer is quite right in saying, that the industrial type now predominates in social life, but possibly he is not so good a prophet of the future and the same can be said of the historians, who see in the growth of society a change of social classes. These formulas are perhaps

applicable to the West, but they are too narrow for humanity as a whole, and even for the European East. Even now in Paris, for instance, the contrast between an inhabitant of the Boulevard St. Germain, representative of the aristocracy, and of the Faubourg Montmartre, representative of the so-called fourth-class, is so great in religious, moral, political, social convictions that they seem to belong to different races.

I am persuaded that only by entirely setting aside the Western social organization can Eastern society be understood. It was not at all differentiated; not only the conditions of differentiation, known to us from the West, were altogether wanting, but even a whole set of circumstances occurred which opposed the formation of classes. We do not see in Byzantism a great variety in non-ecclesiastical literature. Life concentrated itself in the church. Religion satisfied the love of the Greeks for philosophical discussions; the conflux of people in magnificent temples for long divine services, where sometimes a mundane conversation was held, replaced the gatherings for political purposes and for the plays of ancient Greece, and vivified the social life to which the Greeks were so accustomed; while solemn religious processions gave satisfaction to the æsthetic sense. The clergy themselves were closely connected with the mundane society through their wives and children, and did not form a separate political body. Finally, as we have said, the Orthodox religion was a powerful tie, uniting peoples of different blood, Slavs, Armenians, Arabs, Copts, etc. This Byzantine church, remembering the words of Christ, that the gospel is given to all mankind, spoke to every nationality in its own language; the knowledge of Greek was not necessary for understanding the Orthodox faith. The church also, perfectly aware that with the fall of the state Orthodoxy might perish, employed all possible means to strengthen the state and therefore to unite the Byzantine polyglot society; to excite the lords or the warriors against

the emperor, to preach to them, that they are called upon to defend the legal order even against the arbitrary will of the emperor, would have seemed to the Byzantine clergy a hateful heresy. They were convinced that the legal order is sustained by the wisdom of God Himself, who does not need a human arm to crush the most powerful emperor, transgressing the holy precepts. Manifestly, the Greek church understood Christianity in a deeper and more truly Christian spirit than her Western sister. As we have seen the different social classes were *there* animated with ideals, quite opposed, because flowing from quite divers civilizations (Catholic clergy—Christianity transformed by Roman political and moral ideas; aristocracy—feudal system with the memory of conquests; chivalry—Christianity transformed by Eastern influence; citizens—remnants partly of Roman municipalities permeated by Roman juridical conceptions and partly of the old Teutonic social organization); *here* there was an enormous diversity among different nations in *quantity* of culture, but not in *quality*. In the Byzantine empire, the extent of religious, moral, political and social knowledge was the same, but some knew it fully, some only partly, and some almost not at all. The second cause, opposed to the differentiation of society, was the great power of the emperor; he, as the representative of the state, and the guardian of the church, stood so high in the opinion of his peoples, that political rights, independent of him and limiting his power, could not spring up at all.

But, as we have said, his will ought not to prevail as in a despotism; all his power, on the contrary, came from the state, and we see him crushed more than once by the clergy and bureaucracy, who considered themselves depositories of the political and military traditions of the state.*

* My picture of the Byzantine state and society is borrowed from Paparrigopoulos, the eminent Professor of the University of Athens, who devoted almost his whole life to the history of Greece and Byzance. He has himself written an epitome of his voluminous work, written in modern Greek, and published it in French under the title: "*Histoire de la civilisation hellénique*." Paris, 1878.

This idea of society as a whole, not separated by sharp lines and united by a state-religion, was transferred with the Greek church to Russia. We have already spoken of the evolution of Russian society; we must only direct attention to a circumstance, still more opposed to differentiation. It was not the entire inheritance of ancient Greece nor the whole Bzyantine literature which was transplanted into Russia, but only what was translated into the Slavonic language from the Greek, principally in Bulgaria. There was not much of that, and, therefore, it was easily appropriated by the whole population. Thus, the want of the means of education itself had an advantage, not yet fully appreciated by the Russian historians; the unity of society was preserved, and at the time of danger the whole society arose as one man for defending the state and church, because all society was permeated by the very same religious, moral, social, and æsthetic feelings.

Thus we agree with Professor Gumplowicz that a certain difference exists between Russia and Western Europe, but this difference does not serve as a reproach to Russia. If we even grant that the feeling of dependence of an individual upon the state, incomparably more intense in Russia, is a questionable acquisition, the absence of a chasm between the social classes and the absence of a ruling class are benefits, to acquire which the West had to pass through terrible commotions and to suffer effusions of blood. What has been accomplished in Russia by a peaceful historical process, is not yet fully acquired by the West. In this connection we wish to direct the attention of scholars to the Slavonic world. With due respect to Western science, we have always been astonished that it studies this world so little. The comprehension of Slavonic life seems to me indispensable for a true estimation of the forces, which produced Western civilization. All the might of the influence of the Catholic church, of feudalism, chivalry, etc., can be comprehended only by a comparison with a society of the

same Aryan blood, having almost the same political institutions at its appearance on the historical scene, but pursuing so different a path in its development. But this is not all. This Slavonic world, with almost the same social organization until the thirteenth century, divides from this moment into two halves, developing under different influences (the Western ideas and the Byzantine conceptions) with quite different results (Poland, Bohemia, Croatia on the one hand, Russia on the other). But even this is not all which can be said. In Bulgaria and Servia, we see a crossing of Western and Eastern influences, the result of conquests long past (the two countries were conquered by Slavs), and of peculiarities of geographical configuration (mountains separating the tribes and opposing national unity). It is as if nature itself was bent on the most diverse historical experiments.

In stating the relation of the Germans to the Slavonic peoples, Professor Gumplowicz proceeds from his tenet, that Russia threatens Western Europe. As Russia, he says, in its perversity has created a new form in order to increase its influence, panslavism, *i. e.*, a claim for its preponderance over the whole Slavonic world, on the ground of the sameness of blood, and as behind the propaganda of panslavism lurks panrussism, despotism and orthodoxy,—Austria and Germany must take all possible measures to elevate the self-consciousness of national individuality in the particular Slavonic nations and not persecute them. Slavophilism is a phenomenon very sympathetic, politically innocent, consisting in the support of mutual sympathy among the Slavs. But panslavism must be separated from Slavophilism, because the former aims at the absorption of all the Slavs by Russia and to their russification. The most energetic measures should be taken against panslavism, but it ought not to be forgotten that it can spread itself only among such Slavonic peoples as are not yet fully developed. When the nationality is already

determined, it will be ever extremely averse to panslavism, as is evident from the relation of Russia and Poland and now also of Bulgaria; social groups do not die willingly; nations do not, though individuals may, commit suicide. The support of the Slavs, the regeneration of Slavonic nationalities in Germany and Austria, is the most decisive measure against panslavism. There is no reason to fear the narrowing of the limits of the German nationality; the European nationalities were formed during more than a thousand years; their limits are determined, and one cannot acquire much from the other. Finally, if even some one little German city, encircled by Slavonic villages, will become Slavonized, there is no great harm done. On the other hand, the great German cities will continue in their turn to transform into Germans the Slavonic elements, of recent acquisitions.

The rise of the Western Roman Empire revived the aim of ancient Rome for the empire of the world, which was reinforced by the Christian religion, preaching the unity of all mankind under one chief (one flock under one shepherd). This doctrine penetrated into the minds of the Germans at the moment of their vigorous youth. Thus, it is not at all wonderful that we find a long series of emperors, who made great efforts to subjugate the heathen Slavonic peoples. For three hundred years an almost incessant war prevailed, till the Slavonic peoples, living on the shores of the Baltic, were conquered. Meanwhile, Poland and Bohemia, where the echoes of Slavonic struggles with the Germans should have been heard and spread a mistrust of the Germans, became transformed into dukedoms, were Christianized, and willingly acknowledged the supremacy of the emperor as of the common chief of the Christian world. Yet this first encounter necessarily evoked among the Germans, a consciousness of superiority and among the Slavs, a feeling of animosity.

The second period in their relations begins about the end of the twelfth century. Western Europe, profiting by the great Roman inheritance, becoming rich and populous was obliged to look out for lands where its population and industry could find an issue. The struggles between the pope and the emperor, the fall of the imperial power, "the right of the stronger" (*Faustrecht*), the dissensions between the knights and the towns, produced insecurity of life and property. These two facts impelled the Western nations to seek new territories, and the attention involuntarily turned to the Slavonic countries so scantily peopled. In the Slavonic world itself not a few causes contributed to such an immigration, namely, the desire of the dukes to profit by Western tradesmen and artisans, the desire of the clergy who at the beginning were principally of German or Roman blood to surround themselves with inhabitants of the same origin, to people the uncultivated spaces, and to have under their hand a Christian population of longer standing, the efforts among the great lords to enrich themselves with the help of the foreigners. The invasion of the Mongols added to all this an enormous depopulation of the Slavonic countries, suggesting to princes, clergy and lords the desire to fill up the decrease by German immigrants. The result of these circumstances was that not only all the cities, but even a great many villages were in the fourteenth century peopled by Germans in the Slavonic countries of the Catholic faith. We may know by what feelings this foreign population was animated, not only from many collateral indications, but also from the insurrection of Cracow and other German colonies in the beginning of the fourteenth century, aiming to transform Poland into a province of the German empire. Although the insurrection was repressed, it had in Poland very pernicious consequences. The rural Polish population looked on the inhabitants of the towns with mistrust, and did not even consider them as fellow-citizens,

and they in their turn did not regard Poland as their native country. Similar conditions prevailed in Bohemia. Hence the cities could not, as in the West, counterbalance the nobility, becoming a necessary link between the nobles and the peasants, and could not present a strong support to the kings and to the villagers. We must, however, say that in the beginning this German colonization was very useful; only by this great boon of Western labor and capital the rapid bloom of the Catholic Slavonic countries became possible. So the celebrated "*Drang nach Osten*" arose, lasting in a less or greater degree until now; as late as the '50's of our century the eminent German economist, Roscher, preached the immigration of Germans to the Balkan peninsula in order to found there a New Germany.

Incomparably more dangerous was the intellectual subjection of the Catholic Slav-countries. These countries, finding no counterbalance in other intellectual influences, fully assumed the political Western doctrines. We have seen that the latter followed from the very conditions of existence of the Western world. For greater clearness we must recapitulate them:

1. The idea that the sovereign power is only the civil arm required *to educate the nations* in Christian morality, that therefore it necessarily stands in a contrast with the wishes and feelings of the lower orders; when the contrast ceases, the sovereign power ceases also. With the course of centuries the essence of this idea, in my eyes, has not at all changed. The education of nations in Christian morality was replaced in course of time by education in metaphysical conceptions (equality, liberty, and brotherhood) dictated by reason, and in quite modern times in scientific truths (Comte, etc.). The anarchists are in this sense the legitimate children of the Western doctrine of the sovereign power; they uphold the doctrine that the education of the people is completed; the nations want no more tutors; therefore, the state ought to be abolished. Thus the Western

political system is quite powerless against the logical inferences of the anarchists.

2. This education can only be given, except by the clergy, by a leading class, a depository of moral and intellectual or scientific acquirements of humanity.

3. These two tenets had, as a consequence, although undesirable, but quite inevitable, the breaking asunder of Western society into diverse strata, altogether opposed in their feelings. As education depends upon economic security and intellectual capacity, developing itself hereditarily, equality in knowledge could not until now be attained.

The introduction of these doctrines among Catholic Slavs speedily produced certain consequences. Beginning with the twelfth century the power of the Slavonic princes began to fall, and already in the fifteenth century the kings of Poland and Bohemia were almost without influence. The lamentable condition of Poland at the end of the fifteenth century, as a consequence of the decline of the royal power, is very circumstantially stated in a new and very scholarly work,* and in Bohemia the monarchy did not even exist during several years of the fifteenth century (1420-1436). Yet more deplorable was the mutual relation of the social classes: the clergy, severing every tie with the people, rich and depraved, seeking only their own profit from the contending popes; the lords, pervaded by the Western aristocratic conception, and as in Bohemia, thoroughly Germanized; the warriors, more and more penetrated by the spirit of chivalry, drawing a sharp line between them and the inhabitants of the towns; the citizens, German by blood, sympathizing with all the streams of German thought and completely alien to their own country; finally the peasants, destined by the mediæval social order to serfdom; in a word, every class pursuing its own interests and considering the other classes as avowed foes, and the state

* Adolf Pawinski. "*Sejmikiziemskie, 1374-1505.*" pp. 82-240. Warsaw, 1895.

as an odious and useless impediment to reaching these interests. This state of things was bound to evoke a reaction. And, indeed, this reaction expressed itself in Bohemia in a great religious, political, and social movement, completely destroying the old political organization and shaking even the foundations of the mediæval Western society. Poland escaped this catastrophe only by the fact that the predominance of the Catholic church kept her true to her so-called predestination to carry the Western civilization into the Orthodox Slavonized (great part of Lithuania) and Slavonic lands. Thus Poland's attention was drawn away from her internal affairs, and she brought the Catholic religion, the contempt for the absolute power of a king, the doctrine of the position of the leading classes in society into the East; what were the results? History has shown with striking clearness in the years 1772-95 and has impressed her lessons with unspeakable suffering, streams of blood, all sorts of degradation and frauds coming from the East as well as the West of Europe. We must, nevertheless, acknowledge that the brilliant Polish political literature arose under the influence of the evident decomposition of the state in the fifteenth century.

Thus, in the fifteenth century we may confidently say that the Catholic Slavonic world seemed to be predestined to extermination; the German wave slowly overflowed the Slavonic countries where the preceding Western influence had decomposed society and undermined the kingly power, the basis of order in the fifteenth century. At this moment two facts of world-wide importance changed the course of events. In 1453 an energetic Asiatic horde under a military genius as chief, took Constantinople; a whole series of eminent sultans drove back Western Europe. The Asiatic barbarism hindered in the South Slavonic countries for some hundred years the development of civilization, but it covered these lands as with a layer of snow, preserving their strength for a new vigorous youth. Another, a peaceful

genius, sailing from the opposite side of Europe, discovered America, and in this manner guided by his mighty arm the Western overproduction of population, labor and capital in quite another direction. There the Western colonists, animated by the vivifying influences of humanism and reformation, laid the foundation of a state of the greatest material prosperity and of liberty to a degree quite unknown to the old world. Thus, the stream of the Western colonization in the East was, if not wholly stopped, at least extremely weakened. Notwithstanding these facts, the absorption of Slavonic lands did not cease altogether; yet the forces were considerably lessened; while before, the whole colonization of the West tended to the East, now it was exclusively German colonists, for whom the Slavonic lands, as lying near, were more profitable, because the Germans could hope not to be lost to their native country as in America. The dismemberment of Poland, and even the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are nothing else but the consequent steps of a progress, mentioned by us, which began at the time of Charlemagne.

If the movement of colonists into the Slavonic lands diminished, the Western intellectual influence did not stop, and the fall of the Bohemian kingdom in the early years of the seventeenth century was avowedly produced by the weakness of the sovereign power and the decomposition of society, in which there raged political, social, religious dissensions, imported from the West.* But the Western influences made themselves felt most thoroughly in Poland and there at the end of the sixteenth century the organization of the state took almost the form of a political caricature. What in the West was changed under the altered circumstances, remained unchanged in Poland and rose to abnormal dimensions. The power of the king in consequence of humanism, Roman reminiscences, Reformation and Catholic reaction, was considerably strengthened

* Jos. Kalousek. "*Ceské statui pravo*." pp. 389, 390. Praha, 1892.

in Western Europe, but in Poland the distrust of a king, fostered by the Catholic church, could not be eradicated, while the classical idea of the sovereignty of the people transformed itself into a hatred of all political power. In the West the position of the leading classes remained unshaken, but it was very well understood that the other classes must have some liberties. In Poland, on the contrary, the nobility, remembering the doctrines of the classical world, principally of Aristotle, of the necessity of slavery, began to consider themselves as the nation itself, and the other classes almost as its laboring cattle. So the celebrated "golden liberty" arose, which could not even co-exist with the state.* This intellectual influence of the West, even at the present moment, produces disturbances in the South Slavonic kingdoms. The eras of government of "the liberal party" (*napredniki*) in Servia and of the partisans of Stambuloff in Bulgaria, had for their basis the Western tenet of the predestination of the leading classes to rule over the lower orders; this same doctrine principally divides into two opposed parties the Russian and Polish society.

Thus the relation of the Germans to the Slavs is determined by great economical and intellectual currents, lasting a thousand years. The component elements of these currents are two, viz.:

1. The feeling of a superiority, rooted in success (almost the whole of Prussia was anciently Slavonic), and in a fuller development. This feeling leads to the presumption, that the Slavs are a race of minor intellectual capacity, and this latter in its turn justifies injustices to the Slavs (it is silently taken for granted that this race is a detriment to progress and is predestined to extinction).
2. The overproduction of population, industry and capital, which seek an issue and find it most conveniently in

* Mich. Bobrzynski. "*Dzieje Polski wzarysie.*" 3d ed. Vol. ii. pp. 181-87.
 "The Cause of the Decline," pp. 345-68.

the neighboring Slavonic countries. This phenomenon must necessarily aim at the concentration of great landed property, and great commercial, manufacturing and industrial undertakings in the hands of Germans, while the aboriginal (Slavonic) population are intended to become only laborers. This consequence is rendered the easier by the contemporary international law, which tends to a formal equality, and does not fully take into account the real differences in economical and intellectual development. Hence the absence of manufactures is very painfully felt, except in Bohemia, in all the Slavonic countries, which are too feeble to protect themselves by a prohibitive tariff. Against such tendencies of Western Europe, which lie in the very nature of things and were produced, one may say, in the course of a thousand years, the disjointed Slavonic world is too feeble to resist without the help of Russia, and this is one of the chief causes of the panslavistic feelings in a great many Slavonic minds.

We have seen also that the intellectual influence of the West was generally pernicious to the Slavs. This phenomenon is easily explicable by the fact that the West undermined too early the feelings of discipline and cohesion. The incessant wars of ancient Rome deeply rooted in the whole Roman population the necessity of discipline, which found a brilliant expression in the Roman law. This law through the church, state and school, very early disciplined Western society, which met with the Slavs, when the unity of state and church, the identity of political conceptions were already loosened in the West. But these separating elements could do no harm, because society was yet tolerably well accustomed to order; they were even useful, because they tended to progress. On the contrary, the Catholic Slavonic nations wanted discipline and a basis for intellectual unity, which the West could not give at the moment of meeting. Finally, it must be ever kept in mind that political and economical conceptions cannot be

confounded with scientific truths; they are only the efforts of the human mind to bring into order the real political and economic conditions. From this point of view it is quite evident how pernicious must be the transfer of political and economic conceptions from one region into another quite different one; it is as if a Russian traveler would wear a bear's skin in Sicily during winter, because this fur was necessary for him in Russia. I add this remark because it might be concluded from my speaking of the pernicious intellectual influence of the West, that I have in view Western science and literature. With profound respect for Western scientific and literary greatness, I mean only political, economic, and sometimes religious conceptions. Western science has itself recently begun to criticise the Western political and economic system; the first steps were taken in this direction by the socialists, and this is their indubitable scientific merit. Societies of comparative jurisprudence have recently undertaken the study of the relation between the political and economical conceptions on the one hand, and the political and economical conditions on the other. This will inevitably lead to the enlargement of the political and economic horizon and to the foundation of political, economical and moral ideas on a true scientific basis. On this occasion I should like to warn the reader against another possible misunderstanding of my views. I have so often and so strongly insisted on sovereign power, that it might be inferred that I uphold the doctrine of the general usefulness of an absolute monarchy. This idea is completely foreign to my mind; I only defend the thesis that the dependence of the citizen upon the state is very faintly developed in Western Europe and in America.* The abandonment of the doctrine *laissez faire, laissez passer* necessitates a great deal of interference of the state in the social relations, and to this the Western and American

* "The American Commonwealth," by James Bryce. 2d ed. Vol. ii, pp. 575-76. London and New York, 1890.

society is quite opposed under the influences mentioned above. The political form, which the feeling of dependence of an individual upon the state assumes, is quite another question, upon which I have not touched at all because it is of an incomparably minor importance. It is enough to say that this feeling of dependence upon the state was extremely developed in the ancient classical republics. Thus, speaking everywhere of the sovereign power, I mean only the psychic factor, the feeling of dependence upon the *staté*, and not the form which this feeling takes in reality.

The preceding discussion has prepared us for understanding the real position of Russia in the Slavonic world and the rise of the so-called panslavistic theory. It is the tendency, often unconscious, in the Slavonic masses outside of Russia to seek support against the aggressive tendencies of Western capital, labor and industry. To this can be added in Orthodox countries the unity of religion with Russia, very ancient reminiscences of the power of the Roman and afterward of the Byzantine emperors, which was transferred to the Emperor of Russia, more recent memories of help given by Russia during the Turkish yoke. On the other hand, Russia supports and will probably support the Slavonic elements outside of her limits, because otherwise they would be crushed by hostile forces and transformed into Germans, Roumanians, Magyars and even Italians. But Russia has never thought of subjugating these Slavonic countries, or of Russianizing them. The Slavophile party, which in the relations with the Slavs plays a prominent rôle, aims at an independent, national civilization, and this can only be attained when the Slavonic world preserves a variety of languages, political and social formations. In the Slavophile idea, unity without diversity is a uniformity of death; life presents itself always under different aspects. The Slavophiles say only that the Russian language should be much more known among the Slavs

than it is now, but it need not at all replace the national languages; it should only facilitate mutual intercourse among the Slavs, and in this sense its future position can be compared with that of the Latin language in mediæval Europe and the French in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Finally, in relation to the Orthodox church, the Slavophiles wish that it were accepted by all the Slavs, but this is not at all a necessary condition of union; it is only a means leading to greater cohesion and a manifest sign of a complete rupture with the religious, moral, even political conceptions of the West.

If we in conclusion take a final glance at this movement of the Slavs toward union, we shall find the same tendencies among the Italians, the Germans, the Americans (the Monroe doctrine), even among all the Latins (panlatinism) and Teutons (panteutonism). All these movements are, in my eyes, only steps toward the realization of that great dream of the philosophers from the time of Diogenes, of religious geniuses, of political utopists, of scientific scholars, toward a unification of all humanity into one great whole, based on mutual esteem, mutual love, and eternal justice. This union can be accomplished not by wars, not by exploitation, not by exaltation of one nation over the other, not by dominion of one people over the other; but, by mutual love and by the feeling of brotherhood among men as has been said by the greatest religious geniuses of the enslaved, uncultured and despised East.

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